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INTRODUCTION
Wellness programs are commonly implemented in firms that offer employer-sponsored
health insurance plans. A wellness program is generally defined as a program aimed at “health
promotion or disease prevention.”1 Many employers adopt wellness programs with the belief that
guiding employees toward healthier habits will lead to a healthier workforce, thereby lowering
the costs of providing health insurance and reducing absenteeism due to illness. 2 These programs
have been highly popular among large employers, with over eighty percent of firms employing at
least 200 workers implementing some type of wellness program. 3
The two most common types of wellness programs are participatory and healthcontingent programs. Employers use a wide range of both positive and negative incentives to
improve employee participation in both types of programs, which can include material goods and
reduced premiums, or penalties in the form of increased premiums imposed on employees that
do not participate in the program. While both types offer incentives to employees who
participate, health-contingent programs require employees to satisfy certain health criteria to
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receive a reward. Thus, a health-contingent wellness program may require an employee to lower
their cholesterol or weight in order to earn a reward.
Sometimes, participation in either type of wellness program may require the employee to
complete a health risk assessment (HRA). HRAs typically require employees to undergo health
screenings and disclose information about their medical history. 4 As recently as 2016, over half
of firms employing at least 200 workers used HRAs as a part of their wellness programs. 5
The use of HRAs has prompted criticism from commentators concerned that employers
may used the information disclosed in the assessments to make discriminatory employment
decisions.6 For example, an employer may decide against promoting an employee if their HRA
suggests they are at high-risk of developing a condition that may affect their ability to work.
Wellness programs and the potential misuse of information disclosed in HRAs is
particularly worrisome when considering the nature of the incentives used to make
nonparticipation unattractive for employees. While there is plenty to gain from participating in a
wellness program, there is also a lot to lose. Since 2016, employers have been able to impose
penalties of up to thirty percent of the total cost of an employee’s cost of coverage on employees
who choose not to participate in a wellness program.7 However, this was not always the case.
Prior to 2016, imposing any penalty on an employee for their nonparticipation in a wellness
program ran afoul of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The ADA prohibits any employer with fifteen or more employees from discriminating on
the basis of disability in regard to “hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
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compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”8 The
ADA also limits an employer’s ability to compel an employee to undergo a medical examination:
A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not make medical
inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or
as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown
to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.9

Thus, the ADA permits an employer to require an employee to undergo a medical
examination only if the examination is job-related and consistent with business necessity.
However, the ADA carves out an additional exception. Employers are allowed to conduct
“voluntary medical examinations, including voluntary medical histories,” that are a component
of an “employee health program.”10
The term “voluntary” is problematic here since the statute does not explain what makes a
medical examination “voluntary” under these circumstances. In 2000, the EEOC issued guidance
which explained what the term meant under this portion of the ADA: “A wellness program is
‘voluntary’ as long as an employer neither requires participation nor penalizes employees who
do not participate.”11 This definition of “voluntary” stood for over a decade until the EEOC
provided a new definition of the term in 2016.
The new regulations stated that “the use of incentives in an employee wellness program,
whether in the form of a reward or penalty, will not render the program involuntary if the
maximum allowable incentive available under the program” does not exceed thirty percent of the
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employee’s total cost of self-coverage.12 In 2017, the D.C. District Court vacated this
component of the regulations.13 Currently, the EEOC has yet to promulgate any new regulations.
Since the adoption of the 2016 EEOC regulations, a significant amount of scholarly
discussion has been devoted to the concept of voluntariness under the ADA and how the EEOC’s
definition of voluntary may result in increased employment discrimination against individuals
with disabilities.
Many commentators have focused on the apparent inefficacy of wellness programs and
how that should change the balancing of the interests involved . Generally, wellness programs are
crafted with two goals in mind: (1) cost savings and (2) improved employee health. 14 Given that
the ADA generally prohibits any medical inquiry that isn’t “job-related and consistent with
business necessity,”15 whether or not wellness programs actually achieve their goals with a
reasonable degree of success is worth consideration.
An additional requirement for compliance with the ADA is that a wellness program must
be “reasonably designed” such that it has a “reasonable chance of improving the health” of
participating employees.16 Indeed, if participation in a wellness programs involves relinquishing
some of the protections afforded by the ADA, one would expect measurable improvements in
employee health in return. However, the data suggests that wellness programs are not
particularly successful at achieving their aims.17
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The lack of data demonstrating the effectiveness of wellness programs has led some
commentators to suggest a “zero-incentive” rule.18 Given the apparent ineffectiveness of
wellness programs, these scholars argue that prohibiting incentives of any kind is the best way to
ensure that individuals are not coerced into relinquishing their rights under the ADA. After all,
they argue, individuals with disabilities who are “already wracked with medical expenses” are
most susceptible to being coerced into participating in these programs.19 Thus, if participation
doesn’t result in any measurable effect on employee health, there isn’t any competing good to
weigh against the coercion inherent in providing incentives for participation.
While this approach deems the presence of any level of incentive to act as a bar to
voluntary choice, other approaches take a more data-driven route. Strassle and Berkman argue
that “an employer coerces an employee in a way that vitiates voluntariness if, and only if, (1) the
employer intentionally threatens the employee with what a reasonable person would view as a
serious harm unless the employee complies with some demand, and (2) a reasonable person
would find the threat irresistible and therefore comply.” 20 The second prong in their definition of
coercion requires determining what level of “threat” a reasonable person would find
“irresistible.” The authors make this determination by referencing a report from the Federal
Reserve which states that a significant number of Americans would be greatly burdened by an
unexpected expense of $400.21 Thus, in their view, any incentive over $400 would be coercive.
Of course, such a definition of coercion would result in a significant number of false positives.
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However, the authors posit that applying a reasonable person test on a case-by-case basis would
be impractical. Other commentators have taken the middle ground and refused to go so far as to
identify a certain dollar amount that would constitute coercion, but also reject an absolute
prohibition on incentives.22
The other extreme is perhaps best exemplified by the Wisconsin court in EEOC v. Orion
Energy Systems, Inc.23 In that case, an employer’s wellness program, which allowed an
employee who completed a health screen to pay no premium at all, was challenged as being
involuntary.24 Since the employer’s wellness program was instituted before the 2016 EEOC
regulations were promulgated, and the regulations were not held to be retroactive, the court was
prompted to provide its own definition of voluntariness. The court held that “even a strong
incentive is still no more than an incentive; it is not compulsion.” 25 The court asserted that any
program that is “optional” is necessarily a “voluntary” one.26 Thus, the court reasoned that the
difficulty of a decision does not render it involuntary. The only relevant consideration is whether
non-participation would result in termination or another type of adverse employment action.

This paper is a response to the scholarly discussion about the boundaries of voluntariness
under the ADA and suggests a return to the definition of voluntariness that was put forth by the
EEOC in the year 2000. Part I will describe the changes in the EEOC’s position on this issue
since the year 2000. Part II examines how courts have handled the issue. Part III contextualizes

22 Kristin Madison, Employer Wellness Incentives, the Aca, and the ADA: Reconciling Policy Objectives, 51
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 407, 455-56 (2015).
23 208 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1000-01 (E.D. Wis. 2016).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
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the issue within the larger philosophical discussion of voluntariness and coercion. Part IV
examines the concept of voluntariness and coercion as und erstood in contract law. Part V argues
that a return to a definition of voluntariness that prohibits employers from imposing any penalties
on employees best serves the goals of the ADA, not because penalties vitiate voluntariness, but
because they allow for the commodification of the protections provided by the statute.

I.

CHANGES IN THE EEOC’S GUIDANCE
EEOC guidance on the definition of the word “voluntary,” as used in the exception

carved out by the ADA for voluntary medical inquiries that are part of an employee health
program, has undergone significant changes since the year 2000. In 2000, the EEOC issued
guidance stating that a wellness program is voluntary “as long as an employer neither requires
participation nor penalizes employees who do not participate.” 27 While this conception of
voluntariness seems straight-forward, closer inspection reveals it to be more ambiguous than it
may seem.
While certain adverse employment actions such as termination and demotion are clearly
penalties, the distinction between a financial reward and a penalty can be blurry. For example, an
employer could set every employee’s salary at $29,000, but increase it by $1000 for employees
who participate in a wellness program. While this could be considered a positive incentive, it
could also plausibly be considered a penalty since an equally qualified employee loses out on

U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical
Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), EEOC.GOV (July 27, 2000),
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html.
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$1,000 simply because they want to exercise their right under the ADA to keep their medical
information private.28
The apparent ambiguity of the guidelines garnered significant attention when the EEOC
brought a series of suits against employers, alleging that their wellness programs violated the
ADA because penalties were imposed on employees who did not participate in the programs.29
Recognizing that the EEOC’s position threatened to invalidate many wellness programs, a
number of C.E.O.s were reportedly considering aligning themselves with President Obama’s
opponents in Congress.30
Although compliance with the Affordable Care Act does not necessarily entail
compliance with the ADA, executives were confused as to why a “plan in compliance with the
Affordable Care Act” would be the target of a lawsuit. 31 In a letter sent to the Labor, Treasury
and Health and Human Services cabinet secretaries on November 14, 2014, the Business
Roundtable, a group of executives representing more than 200 U.S. corporations, called for a
stop to the “inappropriate actions” taken by the EEOC. 32 The letter warned that allowing the
EEOC to act in contravention of the provisions of the ACA would “send a message to employers
that certain ACA provisions are interpretive only and remain subject to litigation.” 33

28
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The outcry of the business community over the actions of the EEOC focused on the fact
that their wellness programs were compliant with the ACA. However, compliance with the ACA
is not determinative of a program’s compliance with the ADA. The ACA allows healthcontingent wellness programs to impose incentives of up to thirty percent of the total cost of self coverage.34 Moreover, while the ACA requires that programs be “reasonably designed to
promote health or prevent disease,” they do not have to be voluntary. 35 Thus, the ACA incentive
caps are not meant to set the boundaries of voluntariness.
In contrast to the ACA, under the ADA, all medical inquiries pursuant to a wellness
program must be “voluntary.”36 Moreover, according to the EEOC guidelines in place until 2016,
a program is only voluntary if it “neither requires participation nor penalizes employees who do
not participate.”37 Additionally, compliance with ACA wellness regulations is not determinative
of compliance with “any other provision of any other state or federal law, including, but not
limited to, the ADA.”38
Thus, given the distinct requirements of the two statutes, an employer could not be
certain that their ACA compliant wellness program was also compliant with the ADA. A healthcontingent wellness program that required disclosure of medical information and offered an
incentive up to thirty percent of the cost of self-coverage would be compliant with the ACA,

34

See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (2010).
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B); Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group
Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,018.
36 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B).
37 U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance: Disability -Related Inquiries and Medical
Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), EEOC.GOV (July 27, 2000),
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html.
38 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,128 (citing 78 Fed. Reg. at 33168).
35
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however, that same program would violate the ADA because the penalties imposed render it
involuntary.
Perhaps due to the pressure from business groups, or the desire to better align the ADA
with the ACA, in 2016 the EEOC promulgated new regulations on the application of the ADA to
wellness programs. Under the 2016 regulations, an employee health program is voluntary as long
as a covered entity:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

does not require participation;
does not deny coverage to employees who do not participate; and
does not take any adverse employment action against an employee who does not
participate.39

Additionally, the new regulations stated that “the use of incentives in an employee wellness
program, whether in the form of a reward or penalty, will not render the program involuntary if
the maximum allowable incentive available under the program” does not exceed thirty percent of
the total cost of coverage.40
The new regulations thus represent a significant departure from the Commission’s prior
stance. Under the previous regulations, any penalty would render a wellness program
involuntary. In contrast, the current regulations assert that voluntariness is only vitiated by
penalties of a certain degree.

39
40

29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(i), (iii) (2016).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3) (2016) (emphasis added).
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II.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT
Although two courts have recently dealt with the issue of voluntariness under the ADA,

each court reached a very different conclusion on the nature of voluntariness.
In the Wisconsin case EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc., the court adopted a very
narrow definition of voluntariness.41 Orion Energy Systems adopted a wellness program that
allowed employees to pay no insurance premium at all if they completed a health screen. 42 The
health screen required the employee to fill out a health questionnaire, have their weight
measured, and have their blood drawn.43 An employee who decided against completing the
health screen had to pay the full monthly premium amount, which costed $413 for individual
coverage.44 The EEOC brought suit and argued that the wellness program was involuntary
because shifting the full cost of the monthly premium to an employee who opted out of the
program was “so substantial” that Orion’s offer to pay the premium in exchange for participation
should not be considered a “mere incentive.”45
Importantly, the wellness program in Orion was implemented before the 2016 EEOC
regulations were promulgated, and the regulations did not apply retroactively. Thus, the court
was prompted to provide its own definition of what constitutes a “voluntary” medical
examination or inquiry under the ADA.
The court sided with Orion and held that the wellness program was voluntary “in the
sense that it is optional.”46 The court asserted that “even a strong incentive is still no more than

41

EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1000-01 (E.D. Wis. 2016).
Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
42
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an incentive,” and even though an incentive may require an employee to make a difficult choice,
“a hard choice is not the same as no choice.”47 Thus, according to the court, voluntariness exists
whenever one is able to freely choose to participate in a wellness program or not. As such, the
court deemed it unnecessary to consider how certain incentives may affect how an employee
weighs their options. Voluntariness is not negated where an employee is in a situation in which
they must choose between two things that are important to them. According to the court in
Orion, as long as the employer does not otherwise violate the ADA by taking an adverse
employment action against the employee or denying coverage for non-participation, an employer
can implement any type of financial incentive to ensure participation without vitiating
voluntariness.
In AARP v. EEOC, which dealt directly with the 2016 regulations, the D.C. District Court
adopted a much broader approach.48 The AARP challenged the EEOC regulations on the grounds
that a 30 percent incentive level is coercive and thus not aligned with the ADA.49 The court held
that the EEOC’s regulations, which limited incentives to no more than thirty percent of the
employee’s cost of coverage, were not grounded in any data or analysis which indicated that
incentives less than 30 percent of the cost of coverage were not coercive. 50 According to the
court, even an incentive below the 30 percent threshold could be used to pressure employees to
give up private medical information.51 The court held that the EEOC failed to demonstrate that

47

Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 315 (2000).
AARP v. EEOC, 292 F. Supp. 3d 238 (D.D.C. 2017).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 243.
51 Id. at 244.
48
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an incentive falling within the thirty percent threshold would not be coercive and thus vacated
that portion of the regulations.52
The District Court of Connecticut is set to be the next court to consider this issue. In
2019, a class action suit was brought on behalf of all current and former employees of Yale
University.53 Yale’s wellness program, called the Health Expectation Program, imposes a fine of
$25 per week, or $1,300 annually on all employees who do not participate in the program.54 The
complaint points out that in New Haven, Connecticut, where Yale is located, $1,300 is equal to
the costs of “five and a half weeks’ worth of food, four months of utility costs, nearly a months’
worth of housing, or a months’ worth of childcare.”55
The program, which the complaint describes as “unusually punitive,” thus forces
employees to make a difficult choice: either share protected medical information with their
employer or keep this information private and face a substantial penalty. 56 The plaintiffs allege
that such circumstances coerce employees into participating in the program and thus violates the
ADA.57
These cases demonstrate that the courts have offered little guidance on the issue on
voluntariness under the ADA. While the court in Orion suggests a definition of voluntariness
that is attractive for its simplicity, it would allow employers to effectively shift the entire cost of
coverage to employees. While it is certainly true that a difficult choice can still be a voluntary
one, there are certain difficult choices that the ADA prohibits employees from having to make.

52

Id. at 245.
Complaint at 2, Kwesell v. Yale Univ., No. 3:19-cv-1098 (D. Conn. July 16, 2019).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
53
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An employee who is threatened with termination if they refuse to divulge their medical history is
certainly faced with a difficult choice, but according to the court in Orion, the employee is still
capable of making a voluntary choice. However, the ADA clearly prohibits an employer from
placing an employee in such a situation.
The current EEOC regulations suggest that the Commission is not aiming to ensure that
employees never have to make a difficult decision which requires them to choose between
preserving the protections afforded by the ADA or facing financial penalties. Instead, by limiting
penalties to thirty percent of the total cost of coverage, the EEOC aims to protect employees
from having to make decisions of a certain degree of difficulty. However, the problem with this
approach, as the court in AARP pointed out, is that the EEOC did not sufficiently explain why
the thirty percent threshold would achieve that aim. The Commission simply stated that: “given
current insurance rates, offering an incentive of up to 30 percent of the total cost of self -only
coverage does not, without more, render a wellness program coercive.” 58
Data on the average cost of health insurance provided by an employer does not lend
much support to the Commission’s position. In 2020, the average annual premium for single
coverage was $7,470.59 At firms employing a high number of workers who earned $26,000 per
year or less, the average annual cost of coverage was $7,148. 60 Under the current EEOC
regulations, an employer could penalize an employee up to thirty percent of the total cost of
coverage for nonparticipation in a wellness program. Thus, an employee earning $26,000 per
year or less whose annual cost of coverage is $7,148 could be penalized $2,144, or $178 per

58

See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Rules and Regulations: Regulations Under the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31133 (May 17, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R pt. 1630).
59 Kaiser Family Foundation, 2020 Employer Health Benefits Survey
60 Id. Figure 1.6.
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month. The Commission offers no explanation as to why such an employee would not be coerced
into participating in a wellness program that requires them to divulge information protected by
the ADA.

III.

CONCEPTIONS OF VOLUNTARINESS AND COERCION
A voluntary decision is commonly understood as one made without external compulsion.

Thus, “voluntariness” implies that the decision-maker enjoys a certain degree of control over the
choices they make.61 However, voluntariness is vitiated where the decision-maker is subjected to
influence that is “external, intentional, and illegitimate.”62 Where the decision-maker is subject
to such external and illegitimate influence, any decision they make can be considered a product
of coercion. This conception of voluntariness raises numerous questions. First, is any degree of
external influence sufficient to constitute coercion? Also, what constitutes an “illegitimate”
influence? The philosophical literature on the nature of voluntariness and coercion is vast and
complex, and a thorough treatment of the philosophical literature beyond the aim of this paper.
However, the purpose of this paper does call for a framing of the philosophical discussion on
voluntariness and coercion.
Philosophical discussion of coercion can generally be categorized by the use of two
different approaches: the “moralized” approach or the “non-moralized” approach.63 On the

61

Edmund Wall, Voluntary Action, 28 PHILOSOPHIA 127, 130 (2001).
Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Voluntariness of Consent to Research: A Conceptual Model , 39 HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 30, 32-33 (2009).
63 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/coercion/#NozNewAppCoe
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moralized view, coercion only exists when an individual’s rights are at stake in a decision. 64 For
example, on the moralized view, a decision would be the product of coercion if the decisionmaker was threatened with physical harm if they did not accept a proposal. This view of coercion
is “moralized” because it focuses on the presence of an “illegitimate” influencethe threat of
losing one’s “rights”in determining if coercion exists.
On a “non-moralized” or “value-neutral” view, whether or not one stands to suffer a loss
or diminishment of their rights is not determinative. Instead, the non-moralized approach
considers what would have happened in the absence of any external influence. 65 For example, if
a grocery store tells one of its vendors that if they do not lower their prices by 40 percent they
will not do business with them anymore, the vendor’s decision to lower their prices would not be
considered voluntary.66 On this view, the vendor’s decision was a product of coercion even
though they do not have a right to receive business from the grocery store. Instead, all that
matters is that the vendor would not have made the decision to lower their prices had the grocery
store not threatened to end their business relationship. However, the value-neutral approach does
not consider any external influence capable of being coercive. Instead, the approach demands
consideration of whether a reasonable person in the decision-maker’s circumstances would view
what is being threatened as a serious harm. 67
The non-moralized approach offers a much more expansive definition of coercion than
the moralized approach. Under the non-moralized approach, the sort of “sharp dealing” that is
tolerated under contract law could constitute coercion. Many commentators have supported

64 Camila Strassle & Benjamin E. Berkman, Workplace Wellness Programs: Empirical Doubt, Legal Ambiguity, and
Conceptual Confusion, 61 WM. & M ARY L. REV. 1663, 1701 (2020).
65 Id. at 1707.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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adopting the non-moralized approach as it applies to the issue of voluntariness under the ADA
and have advocated for a rule that prohibits employers from imposing any incentives on
employees to participate in wellness programs.68
However, while this conception of coercion has many supporters in the field of philosophy, it
is inconsistent with the conception of coercion in many areas of the law. The conception of
coercion under contract law is indicative of how the concept of voluntariness is generally
understood in most areas of law. As such, it is worth considering how the concept of
voluntariness in contract law aligns with the non-moralized approach to coercion that has been
supported by recent scholarship.

IV.

COERCION AND VOLUNTARINESS IN CONTRACT LAW

Contracts are valid when assent to the bargain by the parties is voluntarily given. Thus, when
a party’s assent is the product of a threat of physical harm or other wrongful act by the other
party, the contract is voidable. In such circumstances, assent by the party is said to have been
given under duress or coercion.69
The Restatement (First) of Contracts defined duress as:
(a) any wrongful act of one person that compels a manifestation of apparent
assent by another to a transaction without his volition, or
(b) any wrongful threat of one person by words or other conduct that induces
another to enter into a transaction under the influence of such fear as precludes
him from exercising free will and judgment, if the threat was intended or should
reasonably have been expected to operate as an inducement. 70
68 Stefanie Brody, Working Well(Ness): The Impact of the ADA Final Rule on Wellness Program Regulation and A
Proposal for A Zero-Incentive Rule, 11 St. Louis U.J. Health L. & Pol'y 209 (2017)
69 R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF C ONTRACTS § 175 (1981)
70 R ESTATEMENT (FIRST ) OF C ONTRACTS § 492 (1932).
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Part (a) deals with situations in which assent to a bargain was not the product of the
party’s free will, such as would be the case where someone else uses the actor’s hand to sign a
contract.71 Such contracts are deemed to be void instead of voidable. 72
Part (b), which is the part relevant to the discussion here, describes a type of duress that
occurs when a party is subjected to threats by the other party which work to vitiate their free will.
This “wrongful threat,” which is generally limited to threats of physical harm, must actually
“preclude” the exercise of free will and induce entrance into a transaction that the party would
not have otherwise entered.73 In considering whether assent to a bargain was the product of
duress as defined by the Restatement (First), courts conduct a two-part inquiry. First, courts
would determine if a party had been subjected to a wrongful threat. If there was a wrongful threat
made, courts would then determine if the threat actually resulted in a loss of free will. 74
Commentators have noted that claims of duress are rarely successful, and courts have
been highly inconsistent in their application of the doctrine. 75 Some have suggested that part of
the courts’ issues with applying the doctrine are attributable to the two-part inquiry used.76 While
determining if there was a wrongful threat is a relatively straight-forward task, determining if
that threat vitiated the party’s free will is not. Even when an individual makes a decision under
duress, they may still exercise free will. Although duress may work to limit the number of
choices that an individual can make, they are still free to choose between the options presented. 77
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The Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopted a different approach. Instead of focusing
on free will, the Restatement (Second) deems a contract voidable where an improper threat leads
a party to assent to a bargain because they were left with no “reasonable alternative.” 78 An
“improper threat” includes the following: (1) a threat of a crime or a tort, (2) a threat that is a
crime or tort, (3) a threat of criminal prosecution, (4) bad faith threat to use civil process, or (5) a
threat to breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing in a contract relationship.79
Whether based on the loss of free will or the elimination of “reasonable alternatives,” a
claim of duress always requires a showing that the action of a party was blameworthy. Some
courts take a broad view as to what constitutes a blameworthy action, including actions that are
“unlawful” as well as morally blameworthy. 80 However, a party is not required to act virtuously.
The examples provided in the Restatement (Second) make it clear that “hard bargaining” does
not constitute duress:
Illustrations:
x

13. A, who has sold goods to B on several previous occasions, intentionally misleads B
into thinking that he will supply the goods at the usual price and thereby causes B to delay
in attempting to buy them elsewhere until it is too late to do so. A then threatens not to sell
the goods to B unless he agrees to pay a price greatly in excess of that charged previously.
B, being in urgent need of the goods, makes the contract. If the court concludes that the
effectiveness of A's threat in inducing B to make the contract was significantly increased
by A's prior unfair dealing, A's threat is improper and the contract is voidable by B.

x

14. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 13, A merely discovers that B is in
great need of the goods and that they are in short supply but does not mislead B into
thinking that he will supply them. A's threat is not improper, and the contract is not voidable
by B.

Illustration 14 suggests that taking advantage of an individual’s weakened position does not
constitute duress where the advantaged party does not intentionally mislead the other party.
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The conception of coercion under contract law thus resembles the moralized approach
describe above. While coercion can render a contract voidable, an act must be morally or legally
blameworthy in order for it to be coercive. Where the balance of power is unequal between
parties, it is not considered wrongful for the advantaged party to leverage their superior position
so long as the balance of power was not a product of moral or legal wrongdoing. As such, the
concept of duress and coercion, as understood in contract law, does not lend support to the
argument that an employee who chooses to divulge medical information to avoid penalties does
so involuntarily. An employee has no right to be provided affordable health insurance by their
employer, so imposing penalties on employees who do not participate in wellness programs is
not “unlawful.” Moreover, imposing penalties on employees for nonparticipation cannot be
described as morally blameworthy either. While numerous commentators have pointed out that
wellness programs are not effective at achieving improved employee health, ineffectiveness does
not render an act morally blameworthy.
Coercion renders a contract voidable because it wrongfully constrains an individual’s
freedom of choice. However, there are situations where a contract is unenforceable even though
both parties agreed to the bargain voluntarily. The formation of a contract can be valid and yet
deemed unenforceable where the subject or terms of the agreement violate public policy. 81
CONTRACTS UNENFORCEABLE ON PUBLIC POLICY GROUNDS
Contract law affords individuals wide latitude in forming contracts. Contract law favors an
unfettered freedom to contract with minimal judicial oversight. The general rule is that
individuals should have “the utmost liberty of contracting and that their agreements voluntarily
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and fairly made shall be held valid and enforced in the courts.” 82 However, while the freedom to
set the terms of a contract is expansive, it is not absolute.
Individuals are free to bargain away the things they own or have rights to, but courts have
routinely held that freedom to contract does not include the right to “privately waive statutes
enacted to protect the public in general.”83 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts supports this
limitation, stating that “[a] promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is
clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such
terms.”84 The Restatement thus supports the use of balancing test in determining if a contract is
unenforceable on public policy grounds, with the respect for one’s freedom to contract balanced
against the detrimental effects enforcement of a contract could have on society.
The Restatement does not limit the public policies a court can take into consideration to those
expressed in statutes or constitutions. The Restatement notes that when proscribing conduct,
“legislators seldom address themselves explicitly to the problems of contract law that may arise
in connection with such conduct.”85 As such, judges will look to legislation for public policies,
but also frequently must derive public policies “on the basis of their own perception of the need
to protect some aspect of the public welfare.”86
As a result, many of these policies derived from a judge’s own perceptions of the public good
“are now rooted in precedents accumulated over centuries.”87 However, the Restatement does not
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direct courts to maintain deference to the societal interests courts sought to protect in the past.
Instead, the Restatement urges courts to recognize the changes in a society’s interests in order to
guard against the enforcement of a contract that might contravene those interests. 88
Considering the exalted status the freedom to contract holds in our society, rendering a
contract unenforceable strikes one as odd, especially given the fact that courts are granted some
latitude in determining what constitutes a societal interest worth protecting. It should be noted
that a contract can be rendered unenforceable on public policy grounds even when the contract is
not illegal, as would be the case where the contract calls for the murder of another person. 89
Moreover, a court’s power to render a contract unenforceable is not limited to situations
where what is bargained for is morally repugnant. Although courts are expected to exercise this
power only when protecting societal interests “clearly outweigh” enforcement of the contract, the
standard is still a very subjective one, and changes in societal interests may prohibit enforcement
of contracts that would have been enforced in the past. 90
V.

A ZERO-INCENTIVE POLICY BEST SERVES THE PURPOSE OF THE ADA

This concept in contract law offers a way of understanding the conflict between the ADA and
wellness programs that supports a prohibition of negative incentives. Essentially, certain
contracts are rendered unenforceable because what has been bargained for should not be
commodified.
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Employment discrimination laws such as the ADA aim to better integrate vulnerable
populations into the workplace and ensure that they are treated fairly. 91 The main reason that the
ADA prohibits an employer from obtaining an employee’s medical information, outside of the
exceptions provided, is to protect the employee from being discriminated against on the basis of
what is revealed in the information. The EEOC has noted that this information has often been
used to “discriminate against individuals with disabilities -- particularly nonvisible disabilities,
such as diabetes, epilepsy, heart disease, cancer, and mental illness -- despite their ability to
perform the job.”92 As such, the ADA generally prohibits the use of medical examinations and
inquiries that are not shown to be “job-related and consistent with business necessity.”93 Of
course, access to an employee’s medical information will not always lead to discrimination, but
the ADA clearly seeks to significantly limit an employer’s opportunity to do so.
Given this goal, allowing employers to impose penalties on employees for nonparticipation
in a wellness program is antithetical to the purpose of the statute. Thus, while the ADA
recognizes the need to protect employees with disabilities against discrimination, the
Commission’s regulations consider the privacy necessary to avoid such discrimination to be
something that can be bargained for. While the thirty percent threshold rule adopted by the
Commission does not necessarily vitiate voluntariness, it does contradict the purpose of the
ADA. Therefore, a better conception of what constitutes a voluntary wellness program under the
ADA would be one that imposes no penalties.
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The relationship between the enforceability of a contract and public policy concerns is
analogous to the relationship between voluntariness and the ADA. As stated before, a contract
can be unenforceable even though it was formed properly and what is agreed to is legal. This is
because the somewhat nebulous idea what is in the “public interest” stands above the formal
requirements of valid contract. Public policy can serve as the basis of invalidating a contract
even when the interests that being protected are not codified. Thus, adherence to formal
requirements is not determinative of enforceability.
The EEOC’s regulations stating that penalties up to thirty percent of the total cost of
coverage do not render participation in a wellness program involuntary is a justifiable
interpretation of the term “voluntary.” Even the most difficult decisions are still made
voluntarily. In this way, the Commission’s regulations seem to provide a reasonable definition of
voluntariness.
However, like public policy in contracts, considerations of a higher-order reveal that the
regulations conflict with the purpose of the ADA. The overarching purpose or “spirit” of the
ADA is to provide robust protection for disabled employees against discrimination. Limiting an
employer’s ability to compel an employee to divulge their medical history is meant to protect
against the use of that information for discriminatory purposes. As noted by the EEOC,
employers who obtained this information would often discriminate against individuals with
disabilities despite their ability to perform the job, which prompted Congress to enact the ADA. 94
However, that protection is weakened when the privacy of an employee’s medical history is
essentially commodified and can be bargained for. For this reason, the EEOC’s regulations
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conflict with the purpose of the ADA, even though the regulations provide a definition of
voluntariness that is logical and comports with the definition of voluntariness found in other
areas of the law. This is important because while the EEOC has authority to promulgate
regulations implementing the portions of the ADA concerning employment matters, the
regulations must ultimately reflect a reasonable interpretation of the statutory text. 95
Thus, while the regulations may reflect a reasonable interpretation of a term in the statute, the
regulations are at odds with the overall purpose of the statute. Discussion of this issue has
perhaps placed too much focus on defining voluntariness. Most of the scholarly attention to this
issue has been focused on critiquing the EEOC’s definition of the word “voluntary” as used in
the ADA. Given the fact that many employees may not be able to afford health insurance if
penalties are imposed, many have argued that the thirty percent threshold vitiates voluntariness.
However, a difficult decision is still a voluntary one.
A more appropriate and effective critique is that the current EEOC regulations commodify
something that the ADA sought to protect: access to an employee’s medical information.
Nothing in the ADA, which provides broad protection for individuals with disabilities, indicates
that Congress intended to allow employers to place their employees in a position where they
have to choose between maintaining the privacy of their medical history or affordable health
insurance. Thus, a rule which prohibits negative incentives best aligns with the purpose of the
ADA.
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